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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the evidence presented by the State sufficient to prove an
intentional burning and that the defendant was responsible for
the burning?

2.

Was the Appellant denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel because of counsel's failure to object to evidence
seized in a warrantless search and because of counsel's
misunderstanding of the rules of evidence which deprived the
appellant of his right to testify?

iii.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.
JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE,

Case No. 860193-CA

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against James Ace
Morehouse for the offense of Aggravated Arson, a Second Degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (1986 Supp.).

A

jury found the defendant guilty following a trial which occurred on
April 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10, 1986, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 1, 1985, around 8:00 p.m., a fire broke out at
a service station at 400 East 300 South in Salt Lake City.

The

station was leased and operated by Appellant James Morehouse (R.
579-80).

The fire department responded, extinguished the fire,

conducted a preliminary investigation and left the premises around
10:05 p.m. (R. 210). The fire department was again summoned to the
premises around 11:00 p.m. to extinguish a second fire (R. 217).
Following investigations of the fire, Appellant Morehouse was
arrested and charged with aggravated arson (R. 18-19).

At trial, Lt. Mauerman, the fire department official in
charge of the fire crew dispatched to the service station, testified
for the State.

Lt. Mauerman stated that based on his experience in

the field and his special training, he believed the first fire was
the result of a faulty electrical system (R. 210-12).

He testified

that the second fire appeared to involve flammable substances (R.
219).

Lt. Memmott, an origin and cause specialist was called to the

second fire. At trial, he testified for the State and concluded
that the fires were not caused by the electrical system (R. 303) but
resulted from flammable liquids (R. 319). He based his conclusions
on personal investigations of the premises following the fire. Mr.
Memmott relied on burn patterns (R. 304), pictures he had taken
following the fire (R. 322), and samples of material taken from the
premises and examined by the State Crime Lab (R. 307-14).

The

evidence obtained through these apparently warrantless searches was
never challenged by defendant's attorney, Mr. Verhoef.
An expert in fires and explosives from the University of
Utah Research Institute, Wayne Ursonback, testified for the defense
that based on his experience and training, the fire started in a
junction box in the ceiling and ignited flammable materials in the
ceiling space above the office (R. 855). Mr. Ursonback based his
testimony on burn patterns, smoke deposits (R. 842), pictures taken
following the fire (R. 828), personal investigations of the
premises, and fire reports (R. 855).
At trial, Mr. Morehouse was prevented from testifying in
his own behalf due to his attorney's misunderstanding of the Utah
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Rules of Evidence (R. 1084-86).

The attorney, Mr. Verhoef,

testified in a later proceeding that at the time of trial he
believed that if Mr. Morehouse testified, the prosecution would then
be able to impeach him because of previous felony convictions (R.
1085).

However, it was argued at the post-trial proceeding that

Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows for a balancing of the
probative value against the prejudicial effect and prevents any
inquiry concerning convictions or sentences served more than ten
years previously (R. 1130).

Further, defense counsel argued that

Rule 609 would have prevented the prosecution from impeaching Mr.
Morehouse based on his prior record (R. 1086).

However, at trial a

motion to allow Mr. Morehouse to testify was never made due to
counsel's erroneous application of the rules and, thus, Mr.
Morehouse was effectively prevented from testifying in his own
defense.
At trial other witnesses testified to Mr. Morehouse's
activities on the evening of November 1st.

Steve Regan, the owner

of the station, and police detective Clegg both testified that Mr.
Morehouse told them he had closed his station between 7:00 and 7:30
p.m. and went directly to the Batters Up Club (R. 441, 585).
Witnesses at the club testified that Mr. Morehouse was at the club
on the evening of November 1, 1986, but differed on their
recollections of when he left (R. 618, 656). However, Shirley
Morehouse, appellant's wife, and Steve Regan both testified that
they telephoned Mr. Morehouse at home shortly after 8:30 p.m. (R.
752, 582-83).
After the fire department had extinguished the first fire,
Mr. Morehouse remained at the station awaiting the return of his
- 3 -

partner, Bill Molise, who was planning to spend the night at the
station to guard against vandalism (R. 216, 525). Mr. Molise
testified that he and Mr. Morehouse took a flashlight and went into
the station to retrieve the money from the register (R. 532). Mr.
Molise testified that Mr. Morehouse knocked the register off the
counter (R. 532). Later Mr. Morehouse's watch was found underneath
the register and the debris from the second fire.

Mr. Molise left

Mr. and Mrs. Morehouse at the station while he collected some things
to spend the night at the station (R. 534).
Mrs. Morehouse testified that she and her husband got tired
of waiting for Mr. Molise and went looking for him.

Upon returning

to the station they saw another car pull out of the opposite
entrance (R. 766). Mrs. Morehouse's testimony concerning the car
was confirmed by Mrs. Slattery who lived across the street from the
station.

She provided a detailed description of an individual she

saw standing in front of the gas station office (R. 627-28) and
later saw leaving with his car headlights off.
Mrs. Morehouse also testified that while she and Mr.
Morehouse were waiting outside the station in their car, another car
drove up to the pumps (R. 767). Individuals got out of the car,
tried to get gas from the pumps, approached the office window,
returned to the car and drove away quickly.

The next minute the

second fire broke out (R. 767). The Morehouses were able to get the
license plate number of the second car which they gave to the police
officer investigating the fire, Officer Clegg. (R. 768). An
investigation revealed that the car in question had been stolen and
had been involved in other criminal incidents that night (R. 456).
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Finally, Harry Beaslin, Mr, Morehouse's insurance agent
testified that Mr. Morehouse had taken out a "garage keeper's"
policy insuring the contents of the garage in April of 1985 (R.
500).

On November fourth Mr. Morehouse notified Mr. Beaslin of the

fire and resulting minor loss, according to the terms of the
insurance policy (R. 499). The following morning Mr. Morehouse
again contacted Mr. Beaslin to advise him that due to the fact that
the damage was minor he had elected to withdraw the claim (R. 499).
Mr. Regan, the owner of the building, testified that he had
attempted to recover on Mr. Morehouse's insurance (R. 596).
Following a trial Mr. Morehouse was convicted of Aggravated
Arson and sentenced on April 1, 1986. On April 21, 1986, Mr.
Verhoef, appellant's trial attorney, filed a motion for a new trial
on the basis of a Utah Supreme Court decision, State v. Banner,
which was issued on April 14, 1986.

At a hearing on the motion, Mr.

Verhoef testified that the decision illuminated his
misunderstandings and error at Mr. Morehouse's trial concerning
impeachment of a defendant through a previous criminal record (R.
122-23).

The motion for a new trial was heard and denied by Judge

Russon (R. 1147).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, Mr. Morehouse contends that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.

The State's

expert witnesses disagreed on the causes of the first fire and
admitted that some of the physical evidence was consistent with an
accidental as well as an intentional burning.

Further, the State

failed to prove that Mr. Morehouse was responsible for set the
fire.
- 5 -

Additionally, the Appellant asserts that his constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel was abridged by his
attorney's deficient performance.

Counsel for the defense failed to

challenge illegally obtained evidence and failed to understand and
apply Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence with respect to Mr.
Morehouse's previous felony convictions.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ARSON.
James Morehouse was convicted of aggravated arson in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (1986 Supp.).

Mr. Morehouse

contends that, even when stretched to its reasonable limits, the
evidence was insufficient to establish that he "intentionally and
unlawfully" damaged a "habitable structure".
The power of this Court is review the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a guilty verdict is well established.

In a

recent decision from the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Hill, 44 Utah
Adv. Rep. 23 (1986) the Court reaffirmed its position by noting:
"While it is not the function of this Court to substitute
its judgment for that of the jury, we will reverse a
conviction if the evidence is so unsubstantial or
inconclusive that reasonable minds must necessarily
entertain a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt."
State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148-49 (Utah 1983); State v.
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).
State v. Hill, 44 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (1986).
Section 76-6-103 Utah Code Ann. (1986 Supp.) defines
aggravated arson as follows:
76-6-103. Aggravated arson.—(1) A person is
guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or
explosives he intentionally and unlawfully
damages:
(a) A habitable structure; or

(b) Any structure or vehicle when any person not
a participant in the offense is in the structure
or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the second
degree.
In the present case, the Appellant first contends that the
State failed to prove that the gas station was "intentionally"
damaged by fire or explosives, and furthermore the Statefs evidence
was insufficient to prove that James Morehouse had committed a crime.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Fred
Mauerman, a lieutenant for the Salt Lake Fire Department who was in
charge of the crew at both fires on November 1st, 1985. Mr.
Mauerman concluded that the first fire was an electrical fire (R.
212) and that the subsequent fire involved flammable liquids (R.
219), fairly common substances at a garage or gas station.
The State also called Capt. William Memmott, an origin and
cause specialist with the Salt Lake Fire Department (at the time of
the fire a lieutenant).

Mr. Memmott testified that he found burn

patterns indicating the second fire had four points of origin, an
"indication" to him that the fire was "intentionally set" (R. 321).
Mr. Memmott also concluded, after testing samples taken from the gas
station on November 4, that the flammable liquid involved in the
fire was gasoline (R. 307). In addition, he testified that the
first fire was caused by "flammable liquid being poured and set on
fire" (R. 321), that the fire was "intentional", and that there was
no connection between the first and second fire (R. 322). Later,
Mr. Memmott agreed that a flammable liquid accidentally spilled in
the attic would have created a spill pattern "similar to someone
pouring something up there." (R. 361).
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Mr. Mclff, an investigator for the fire department and a
witness for the State, testified that the fire was intentionally set
based on his observations that the electrical system did not cause
the fire (R. 565-67), and the burn patterns found at the scene which
were consistent with a pouring pattern,

Mr, Mclff also agreed

however that there were indications that the fire was accidentally
set (R. 571).
The inconsistencies and uncertainties between the
prosecution's own witnesses indicate the lack of evidence and the
guesswork relied on by the State to establish an intentional
burning.

Aggravated arson requires that the actor "intentionally"

burn a habitable structure.

While testimony from Mr. Memmott and

Mr. Mclff indicated the burn patterns were consistent with an
"intentional" burning (R. 321-22), both conceded that the fire could
have been due to accidental causes (R. 361, 571). In State v. Hill,
supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Where the only evidence presented against a
defendant is circumstantial, the evidence
supporting a conviction must preclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is
because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis
of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
44 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24 (citation ommitted).
Applied to the facts of this case, the State presented
minimal evidence consisting largely of conflicting opinions from its
own experts, of an intentional burning.

According to these same

experts, the fire could have been accidental, a hypothesis
consistent with innocence not precluded by the State.
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Assuming, arguendo, that the fire was intentionally set,
the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that Mr. Morehouse
was the responsible party.

At trial, the State established that the

first fire was reported at 8:09 p.m. and that Mr. Morehouse's two
alibi witnesses were inconsistant as to the exact time the defendant
left the Batters Up Club where he had stopped after locking up the
station.

Speaking of the incident which had occurred five months

earlier, Howard Arbulkle testified that Mr. Morehouse had left the
club sometime between 7:00-7:30 (R. 618), while Herbert Smith
testified that defendant left sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30
p.m. in order to meet his wife at home by 9:00 p.m. (R. 656-66).
The State failed to contact a third alibi witness for Mr. Morehouse
(R. 460). The police could not establish how long the first fire
had been burning thus the time discrepancies lend nothing to the
State's cases (R. 460). Additionally, when questioned on the
evening of the fire Mr. Morehouse told Detective Clegg that he left
the Batters Up Club between 8:15 and 8:30.
With respect to the second fire, Mr. Morehouse placed a car
at the scene seconds before the blaze flared up again and was able
to provide police with the license number of a vehicle which had
been stolen and involved in other criminal activity on the evening
in question.

(R. 444, 456). Mrs. Slattery, a woman living near the

station also saw a car and an unidentified individual drive off
moments before the flames were visible in the windows of the gas
station (R. 628). This evidence was unrefuted by the State.
Finally, Larry Beaslin, Mr. Morehouse's insurance agent
testified that Mr. Morehouse had a $10,000 "garage keepers policy"
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covering contents of the garage and liability to cover customers1
cars (R. 496), with a $100 deductible (R. 674). He testified Mr.
Morehouse contacted him about the fire the morning of November
fourth, as required by the policy (R. 503). Mr. Morehouse indicated
that the damage was around $200 (R. 499). Mr. Beaslin testified
that Mr. Morehouse contacted him one day later, November fifth,
after deciding that the claim was too minor to pursue (R. 504).
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the
State was insufficient to establish the guilt of Mr. Morehouse.

The

Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the "insufficiency of
evidence" argument in State v. Hill, supra.

In Hill, the defendants

had visited an antique store that was burglarized later that same
evening.

Some of the merchandise stolen from the store was found,

along with a bill of sale, in the defendants1 possession.

In

reversing the jury conviction for burglary and second degree theft,
the Court held that the prosecution must preclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence because a reasonable hypothesis of innocence
necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

Id. at 24.

The evidence against Mr. Morehouse was inherently
insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

State relied on the fact that Mr. Morehouse's alibi witnesses
disagreed as to the time he left the Batters Up Club, and his
failure to establish his whereabouts from 7:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.,
the time at which the State concluded the first fire was set.
However, the State bears the burden of proof and Mr. Morehouses'
failure to establish the exact time he left the bar is insufficient
to prove that he was at the station and started the fire.
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With respect to the second fire the State relies on Mr.
Morehouse's presence at the station, the fact that he was seen
coming out of the building shortly before the fire broke out, his
inconsistent statements concerning the arrival time of the
suspicious car at the station, and the fact that he filed and
cancelled an insurance claim.

Viewed individually or considered

together these circumstantial factors are insufficient to convict
Mr. Morehouse of intentionally burning the station.
In this case, the State appears to have engaged in a
"process of elimination11 in charging the appellant.

For example,

the evidence relied on by the State could raise equally serious
doubts about the role of the owner of the building in the incident.
The owner, Mr. Regan, was notified at his home in Holladay, of the
fire around 8:30 p.m.

(R. 582). He testified that he immediately

called Mr. Morehouse (R. 582), but received no answer.

Mr. Regan

then testified that he waited 30-45 minutes (R. 583), and received
an answer on the second call, about 8:30 or 8:40 (R. 583). Clearly,
a discrepancy exists on the times involved.

Although Mr. Regan's

home was approximately 18 minutes from the station (R. 607) he did
not arrive at the station until 9:20 (R. 602). His whereabouts
before that time were unconfirmed (R. 602). On cross-examination
Mr. Regan testified that he had been loosing money on the gas
station since he had purchased it (R. 602), and that he had tried to
collect on Mr. Morehouse's insurance (R. 396) for the extensive
damage to the structure (R. 591), none of which was covered by the
insurance policy negotiated by Mr. Morehouse.

Finally, while Mr.

Regan testified that he did not have a key to the building (R. 601),
he had gained access before due to a weak lock (R. 601).

The State failed to establish that the station was
intentionally burned and further failed to prove that Mr. Morehouse
was the person responsible for the burning of the structure. As
previously noted, the State's expert witnesses were inconsistent on
the cause of the first fire, and a suspicious vehicle was identified
at the gas station seconds before the second fire.

The evidence

presented by the State was so circumstantial that any number of
individuals could have been implicated.

All of the facts indicate

that the defendant had several reasonable hypotheses consistent with
innocence and the State's circumstantial evidence was insufficient
to establish the guilt of the defendant.

Therefore, Mr. Morehouse

respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed.
POINT II. MR. MOREHOUSE WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
A.

COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH.

At trial, several fire and police investigators testified
concerning evidence obtained at the scene of the fire, the garage
leased and operated by Mr. Morehouse.

Captain Memmott testified

that he took two rolls of photographs of the building the night of
the fire, a roll the morning after the fire, and another roll three
days after the fire (R. 322). Captain Memmott also testified that
he obtained samples from around the premises but failed to note when
and where the samples were taken (R. 353). He indicated one sample
went to the State Crime lab on November fourth (R. 308), three days
after the fire, on the same day he returned to the premises to take
pictures.

Mr. Mclff, an investigator for the Salt Lake County Fire
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Department, testified that Capt. Memmott called him to the scene of
the fire around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. the morning after the fire (R.
563), and the ensuing investigation lasted two and a half hours (R.
564).

Thus, while investigators entered the premises numerous times

following the fire there was no indication that these "searches"
were conducted pursuant to a search warrant.
did not consent to the searches. (Addendum A).

Further, Mr. Morehouse
However,

Mr.Morehouse's counsel failed to challenge the evidence "obtained
from the warrantless intrusions."
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
effective assistance of counsel in two companion cases, United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In Cronic, the Court emphasized that effective

advocacy is the pillar upon which our system of justice is founded.
Without effective advocacy, the Court stated the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to a fair trial suffers.
In Strickland v. Washington, the Court established a two
prong test for analysis of the effectiveness of counsel.

First, the

Court required the defendant to show a deficiency in counsel's
performance.

The Court defined "deficient performance" as that

falling below an "objective" standard of reasonableness.

The second

prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show the
deficiency prejudiced the defense.

To establish prejudice, "the

defendant must show that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
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The Utah Supreme Court's rulings on ineffectiveness of
counsel have been consistent with Cronic and Strickland,

In State

v, McNicol, 534 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976), the Utah Court reaffirmed
a previous holding when it stated,
[T]he right of the accused to have counsel is not
satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance
in the record by an attorney who manifests no
real concern about the interests of the accused.
He is entitled to the assistance of a competent
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
accused and present such defenses as are
available under the law and consistent with the
ethics of the profession, (footnotes omitted).
Consistent with Strickland, the Utah Supreme Court, in
State v. Lairby, 669 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984) held, that in
reviewing the effectiveness of counsel argument the following
factors should be considered:
(1) the burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendant, and proof of
such must be a demonstrable reality and not a
speculative matter.
(2) A lawyer's legitimate exercise of judgment
in the choice of trial strategy or tactics that
did not produce the anticipated result does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
(3) It must appear that any deficiency in the
performance of counsel was prejudicial,
(citations omitted)
In State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979) prejudice was
defined as a reasonable likelihood that without counsel's error, a
different result would have occurred.

Jjd. at 920. According to the

Utah Supreme Court in Lairby, this standard is higher than the
standard of Strickland but the Utah Court stated it would "defer to
the federal standard for prejudice where a defendant claims a sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been
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violated."

Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205.

Thus, the Utah Court seems to

require a reasonable probability that but for the defense counsel's
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
In the present case, performance by counsel for the defense
was first deficient because of the failure to object to the
admission of evidence obtained in a warrantless search.

In Michigan

v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the United States Supreme Court found
investigatory entries made by the police following a fire to be
unconstitutional without a warrant.
was similar to the case at bar.

The factual situation of Tyler

A midnight fire occurred at a

furniture store. While the fire was still being extinguished fire
and police personnel conducted an investigation until smoke and
darkness forced abandonment of the building.
the investigation was completed.

Early the next morning

Entries were also made in the

weeks preceding the trial. Responding to defendant's argument that
the evidence taken during these investigations was inadmissible as
fruit of an illegal search the Court concluded that because of the
emergency situation the fire department did not need a warrant for
the initial entry to fight a fire.

Tyler at 509. Similarly,

because the trial investigation was aborted due to smoke, the Court
held that the entry the following morning was a continuation of the
first, thus a warrant was unnecessary.

Id. at 511. However, the

evidence obtained in warrantless investigations made days and even
weeks after the fire was inadmissible because such entries were
detached from the exigency of the fire and traditional search
requirements were in effect.

Id.
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Applying Tyler to the facts of this case demonstrates that
some of the evidence obtained by Captain Memmott, including the
pictures, taken three days after the fire should have been
inadmissible.

Additionally, because Captain Memmott failed to keep

accurate records of when and where he obtained each piece of
evidence (R. 322, 353), it is uncertain which exhibits and evidence
were products of a warrantless "search".

Thus, those that could not

be identified specifically with a date and location should have been
suppressed along with the conclusions reached by Captain Memmott (R.
298, 350) which were based on the illegally obtained evidence.

Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963).
A more recent United States Supreme Court decision,
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984), also involved the
constitutionality of administrative searches on fire-damaged
property.

In Clifford, the fire department responded to a fire at

5:40 a.m.

By 7:00 a.m. the fire was extinguished and all fire

department and police personnel had left the scene.

At 8:00 a.m. an

investigator for the fire department was assigned to the case. He
arrived on the premises around 1:00 p.m. and proceeded to look for
evidence.

Id. at 293.

The Court listed a variety of factors in

concluding that entries made subsequent to the exigent circumstances
of the fire were warrantless nonconsensual "searches" in violation
of defendant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights:
[W]hether there are legitimate privacy interests
in the fire damaged property that are protected
by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent
circumstances justify the government intrusion
regardless of any reasonable expectations of
privacy; and whether the object of the search is
to determine the cause of the fire or to gather
evidence of criminal activity.
- 16 -

Id, at 292. The Court noted that between the time of the fire and
the investigation the defendant had taken steps to secure his
privacy by boarding up the house, thus the subsequent entry by fire
department personnel was not a continuation of the earlier entry
pursuant to the emergency of the fire but was made without a warrant
in violation of defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.

Id.

at 296. According to the Court, privacy expectations varied with
the type of property, the amount of damage, the prior and continued
use of the premises and, in some cases, the ownerfs efforts to
secure it against intruders.

Id. at 292.

Applying the Clifford factors to this case, a reasonable
conclusion is that the intrusions subsequent to the exigencies of
the fire at the service station, were violations of Mr. Morehousefs
reasonable expectation of privacy.
following the fire.

The premises had been secured

The doors were locked, the hole in the bay door

had been blocked with the dumpster (R. 214) and Mr. Morehouse had
arranged to have Mr. Molise spend the night on the premises (R.
525-26).

While the building was commercial, it had not been

seriously damaged (R. 256, 262) and Mr. Morehouse started cleaning
up immediately and continued to use the premises (R. 539). The
entry effectuated to investigate and take pictures three days
following the fire was a search because of the time span from the
initial entry.

As the Supreme Court stated in Clifford:

Where, . . ., reasonable expectation of privacy
remain in the fire damaged property, additional
investigations begun after the fire and police
officials have left the scene generally must be
made pursuant to a warrant on the identification
of some new exigency.
464 U.S. at 293.

Unlike the situation in Tyler, nothing indicates that Mr.
Memmott was forced to cease his preliminary investigation following
the fire because of smoke.

Further the Utah Supreme Court has

previously held that leased premises are within the protection of
the Fourth Amendment and consent of the landlord is insufficient to
justify a warrantless search of lessee's premises.
432 P.2d 64 (Utah 1967).

State v. Kent,

Mr. Morehouse did not consent to the

search (See Addendum A), and as lessee, he was the only individual
who could consent to such a search.
Counsel's failure to challenge the admission of the
illegally obtained evidence constituted a deficiency in
representation.

The pictures were relied on almost exclusively by

the State's expert witness, Captain Memmott, and from them he drew
many conclusions.

Captain Memmott admitted that only one roll of

film was taken the night of the fire (R. 322) and that the other two
rolls of film and the lab samples were taken during subsequent
investigatory searches of the station (R. 322, 353) made without a
warrant or Mr. Morehouse's permission.

According to Tyler and

Clifford such evidence is inadmissible, and Wong Sun establishes
that conclusions based on illegally obtained evidence are also
inadmissible.
evidence.

However, Mr. Verhoef failed to challenge the

Under Strickland, the deficiency was prejudicial because,

based on the strong precedent in the area of illegally obtained
evidence, there existed a reasonable likelihood that absent
counsel's omission some of the evidence would have been suppressed.
Without the suppressed evidence, the fire investigators may not have
been able to reach the opinion that the fire was arson-caused.
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Thus

the prosecution could not have established the corpus delicti of a
crime.

Even if the opinion of the investigators could have been

admitted without the evidence in question, suppression of some of
the physical evidence could have led to a different outcome in this
admittedly close case (R. 1111).

Because of this deficiency of

performance, Appellant's conviction should be reversed.
B.

DEFENDANT'S CASE WAS PREJUDICED BECAUSE COUNSEL FAILED
TO MOVE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF MR. MOREHOUSE'S PREVIOUS
FELONY CONVICTIONS UNDER RULE 609 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE.

Mr. Morehouse's attorney, Mr. Verhoef, filed a Motion for a
New Trial on April 21, 1986 (R. 122). The motion was based on Mr.
Verhoef's belief that a Utah Supreme Court decision, State v.
Banner, narrowed the application of the rule of evidence allowing
impeachment of a criminal defendant by prior felony convictions.
(Addendum B).

In a hearing on the motion on May 2, 1986, Mr.

Verhoef testified that he assumed Mr. Morehouse could be
cross-examined on all prior felony convictions and on this basis he
prohibited Mr. Morehouse from testifying in his own behalf at trial
(R. 1084-85).

Thus, Mr. Verhoef failed to investigate any motions

limiting examination of Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions (R. 1109)
even though his client expressed, at their first meeting, his desire
to testify on his own behalf (R. 1109).

Mr. Verhoef was ineffective

as counsel because he failed to apply Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the rules April 13, 1983,
with an effective date of September 1, 1983. As adopted, Rule 609
of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a witness must answer
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questions concerning prior convictions within a ten year period if
the previous crime involved dishonesty or if the "crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year" and the
trial court determines probative value of the evidence outweighs the
prejudicial effect.

Additionally, if the date of conviction or

release from confinement is more than ten years old the evidence is
inadmissible absent a special finding by the court and notice to the
adverse party.

(See Addendum C ) .

As adopted, Rule 609 conflicted with §78-24-9 Utah Code
Ann. (1953) which allowed a witness to be cross-examined on any
previous felony conviction.

(See Addendum D).

While State v.

Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) was the first Utah case to declare
Rule 609 inconsistent with §78-24-9, the conclusion that Rule 609
superseded the conflicting statute was statutorially established,
and is specifically stated in the Preliminary Committee note preface
to the Utah Rules of Evidence which declares "any existing statutes
inconsistent with these rules, if and when these rules are adopted
by the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed."
Vol. 9B (Supp. 1986).

Utah Code Ann.

Further the Court pointed out in Banner, 717

P.2d at 1333, §78-2-4 of the Utah Code Ann. (See Addendum E) makes
it clear that the Utah Supreme Court has the authority to adopt new
rules of evidence.

Existing inconsistent laws must yield to new

promulgations as long as the new statutes do not modify or change
substantive rights.

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-4 (Supp. 1986)

Thus, Mr.

Verhoef's performance was deficient because he failed to know the
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Utah Rules of Evidence, three years after the Rules were adopted in
Utah.

Mr. Verhoef's deficiency effectively kept Mr. Morehouse from

testifying on his own behalf.1
Applying the Strickland standard to the performance of
counsel in this case, Mr.Verhoef's decision to keep Mr. Morehouse
from testifying was not a tactical decision but was based on his
misunderstanding that §78-24-9 of the Utah Code Ann. would have
allowed the prosecution to examine any witness as to previous felony
convictions (R. 1084-85).

The misunderstanding was prejudicial to

Mr. Morehouse because it was serious enough to deprive Mr. Morehouse
of a fair trial.

The correct application of Rule 609 would have

allowed Mr. Verhoef to move for the limitation of examination
concerning the appellant's previous felonies.

A favorable ruling on

the motion would have enabled Mr. Morehouse to testify in his own
behalf, and based on the lack of evidence at trial, there was a
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different
result.2
Testimony established that this was a close case (R. 1111)
and while a jury verdict is usually unimpeachable, arguably, the

1 While Utah has operated under the Utah Rules of Evidence since
1983, federal courts have operated under the Federal Rules of
Evidence since 1975. Numerous federal courts have interpreted Rule
609. See United States v. Smith, 551 F. 2d 348 (D.C.Cir. 1976);
Government of Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528 F.2d 742 (3rd Cir.
1976).
2

While the record indicates the judge would have allowed
cross-examination on Mr. Morehouse's previous felonies (R. 1137-38,
1140-1147), the informal post-trial decision was based on inaccurate
information as to the dates and previous felonies, (R. 1135, 1147)
and had no binding judicial effect.
Additionally, briefing of the
issue would have provided contradictory precedent for Judge Russon's
decision and may have lead to a different conclusion.
- 21 -

defendant's failure to testify can be determinative in a close case
in spite of the jury instructions to the contrary.

Mr. Verhoef

testified that he believed there were some gaps in the case he
presented that could have been filled by Mr. Morehouse's testimony
(R. 1118-1120) and that the appellant's failure to testify weighed
heavily on the jury (R. 1121).

Because the case was so close, and

because the evidence against Mr. Morehouse was minimal, prejudice is
more easily established.

According to Strickland, "a verdict or

conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to
have been affected by errors than one with over whelming record
support." 466 U.S. 668, 696.
Furthermore, another line of cases suggests that where
ineffective assistance of counsel deprives defendant of his right to
testify the resulting prejudice is to be presumed.
Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Me. 1986).

United States v.

In Butts, counsel, acting

on the belief that the defendant would be impeached by his prior
felony convictions, effectively kept the defendant from testifying.
In granting the defendant's motion for a new trial the court refused
to apply the second prong of the Strickland test and held:
This Court is satisfied that ineffective
assistance of counsel which results in a
deprivation of the defendant's right to testify
transcends conventional Sixth Amendment analysis
and that prejudice is sufficiently proven, if not
to be presumed from, the resulting denial of the
defendant's right to testify.
Id. at 1149.

The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that the

accused has a right to testify in his own behalf, See Nix v.
Whiteside,

U.S.

, 89 L.Ed. 2d 123, 138 (1986).

The

facts of the present case seem to indicate that Mr. Verhoefs
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ineffective assistance of counsel prevented appellant from
testifying.

"Where the very point of a trial is to determine

whether an individual was involved in criminal activity, the
testimony of the individual himself must be considered of prime
importance."

Butts at 1147. Prejudice must be presumed because Mr.

Morehouse was not allowed to testify.
Under Strickland, a reasonable defense attorney would have
known the Utah Rules of Evidence that had been in effect for three
years.

Mr. Verhoef's conduct fell below the

practice and constituted a deficiency.

objective standard of

The appellant was prejudiced

by the deficiency because he was denied the right to testify in his
own behalf and in such a close case there was a reasonable
likelihood his testimony would have resulted in a different
verdict.

Applying Butts, prejudice would be presumed.

Thus under

either standard Mr. Morehouse was prejudiced as a result of Mr.
Verhoef's deficient performance and the conviction based on the
deficiency should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Because of the state's inability to prove an intentional
burning and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of Mr. Morehouse
innocence and because defense counsel's performance was deficient in
two areas which prejudiced the appellant's case, the Appellant,
James Morehouse, respectfully petitions this Court to reverse his
conviction and remand this case to the district court for either a
new trial or dismissal of the charges.
a fit

Respectfully submitted this

/^•

day of February, 1987.

^e^^/
CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be devliered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84114, this

/ 9 — day of February, 1987.

CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
DELIVERED by

this

day of February, 1987.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
v.

Case No. 860193CA

JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE,
Defendant/Appellant

I, JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE, being first duly sworn, according
to law, on my oath, depose and say:
1.

I am the defendant/appellant in the above-entitled case.

2.

I was the lessee of the property involved in the

alleged arson in this case.
3.

At no time during the investigation of the alleged

arson by the police and fire departments did I give my consent for
their entry onto that leased property.
DATED this p.£k

day of February, 1987.
•7

JAMES ACE

MOREHJOUSE"

'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN T O / b e f o r e me t h i s ) 2Ai\
February,

'
day of

1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g i n fonjjk

My Commission Expires:

~J
^.kx

(~V^,,.v-e

ADDENDUM B

APR 21

1 rtuvitLU

t-

I (U&Lt

VERHOEF, #3326
1 MARTIN
Attorney for Defendant

2
3

255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-8998

4

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

5

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

6
7 THE STATE OF UTAH,
8

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,

9
Case No. CR-86-257

10 JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE,
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Defendant.
The defendant above-named, by and through his counsel of
record, and pursuant

to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure hereby moves the Court to grant the named defendant a
new trial in the interest of justice upon the grounds and for the
reasons set forth below:
1.

This matter

was

tried

before

a jury, and

the

defendant sentenced on the 14th day of April, 1986.
2.

On the 14th day of April, 1986, the Supreme Court of

the State of Utah in Case No. 20371 captioned The State of Utah v^
[Nicholas Banner applied a rule which, in the opinion of counsel,

22
is a substantial deviation to the rule existing previously in that

23
the impeachment of a defendant who testifies at his trial in a

24
25

criminal case by use of prior felony convictions would now be more
narrowly construed.

A copy of said case is attached hereto.

3.

1
2

Counsel's

calling defendant

sole

and

substantial

to the stand to testify

reason

for

not

in his own behalf

was

3 based solely

upon the existence of a prior criminal history of the

4 defendant.

The undersigned would have called the defendant to the

5 stand in light of the U t a h S u p r e m e Court's holding in the Banner
6 case.
7

4.

The undersigned

believes

that

the

issues

of

fact

8 were very close indeed and that defendant's failure to testify
9 substantially affected the verdict of the jury.
10

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant should be

11 accorded a new trial or such other relief as the Court

deems

12 appropriate.
13

Dated this

3 /

day of April, 1986.

14

^

15

S7

'' r/>

MARTIN VERHOEF

16

19

L

Attorney for Defendant

17
18

/.^/

/S

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d a copy of the f o r e g o i n g
Motion for New T r i a l , postage prepaid, to Ernest W. Jones, Deputy

20 County A t t o r n e y , 231 E a s t 400 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111,
21 and t h e a t t o r n e y t o be a s s i g n e d a t t h e L e g a l D e f e n d e r ' s

22 A s s o c i a t i o n , 333 South 200 E a s t , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 t h i s
23

c £ / ^ d a y of April,

1986.

24
25

Au<^4* f). ^jkc/hi-^t
rfV-,^

ADDENDUM C

RULE 609
IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period
of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later
date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs
its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of
a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence
of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied
that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
Committee Note to Rule 609.
The pendency of an appeal does not render a
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and Uconviction
inadmissible. This is in accord with
tah
changes Utah law by granting the court discase law. State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6,
cretion in convictions not involving dishonesty 206 Pac. 717 (1922).
or false statement to refuse to admit the evi- r » — r>~p«™™dence if it would be prejudicial to the defen- Cross-References.
dant. Current Utah law mandates the admisFelony conviction, witness must answer as
sion of such evidence. State v. Bennett, 30 t o fact °^ 78-24-9.
Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973); State v
Traffic conviction not affecting credibility as
Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976); State v. witness, 41-6-171.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980).
There is presently no provision in Utah law
similar to subsection (d).

ADDENDUM D

78-24-9. Duty to answer questions—Privilege.—A witness must answer
questions legal and pertinent to the matter in issue, although his answer
may establish a claim against himself; but he need not give an answer
which will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony;
nor need he give an answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade
his character, unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact from which
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer as to
the fact of his previous conviction of felony.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; 0. 1943,
Supp., 104-24-9.
Compiler's Notes.
Tnis section is nearly identical to former
section 104-49-20 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-References.
Cross-examination of defendant, 77-44-5.

P r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-incrimination,
Const. Art. I, §12; Rules of Evidence,
Rule 25.
Construction and application of section,
"Pertinent to the matter in issue," as
used in predecessor section relative to
questions witness must answer, included
those collateral matters, if any, in regard
to which witness might be examined to

ADDENDUM E

78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for
use in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and evidence
adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of
both houses of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro
tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens
of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons
admitted to the practice of law.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-4, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 42.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1986, ch. 47,
§ 42 repeals § 78-2-4, as enacted by Laws
1951, ch. 58, § 1, pertaining to rulemaking

powers of Supreme Court, and enacts the
above section.
Law Reviews. — Utah Rules of Evidence
1983,1985 Utah L. Rev. 63,64.

